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INTRODUCTION
Tobias Dixon, driving a motorcycle, hit Devyn Allen upon Allen
merging into the center turn lane.1 The hit ejected Dixon from his
motorcycle onto the highway, and then Patrick Jackson’s vehicle struck
him.2 Dixon, the motorcycle driver, proceeded to sue: (1) Allen; (2)
Progressive Security Insurance, Allen’s motor vehicle insurer; (3)
Louisiana Pizza Group (“LPG”), Allen’s employer; (4) Tudor Insurance
Company, LPG’s insurer; (5) Jackson; (6) Command Construction,
Jackson’s employer; and (7) Gray Insurance Company, Command
Construction’s insurer.3 The trial court dismissed the claims against
Jackson, Command Construction, and Gray Insurance Company
(collectively, “Jackson”) on summary judgment because a lack of
evidence existed as to whether Jackson ran over Dixon.4
Dixon did not appeal the summary judgment dismissal of Jackson.5
LPG was the only party to timely appeal Jackson’s dismissal, contending
that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for Jackson.6 On
appeal, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal held that the summary
judgment ruling for Jackson was not appealable by LPG, a co-defendant,
because Dixon, the plaintiff, did not appeal Jackson’s dismissal.7

1. Dixon v. Gray Ins., 223 So. 3d 658, 659 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2017).
2. Id. at 659–60.
3. Id. at 660.
4. Id.
5. Dixon originally filed an appeal, but he dismissed it before any record of
his appeal was filed. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 660–61; see also Grimes v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 36 So. 3d 215,
217 (La. 2010) (establishing that parties can only appeal adverse portions of the
trial court’s judgment).
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In Dixon v. Gray Insurance Co., the court determined that LPG could
not appeal Jackson’s summary judgment dismissal on the merits.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 966 governs motions for
summary judgment in Louisiana.8 Article 966(G) states that when a court
dismisses a party on summary judgment, it cannot consider the dismissed
party in any subsequent allocation of fault; evidence cannot be admitted;
the dismissed party cannot be referenced in any attempt to establish its
fault; and the dismissed party cannot be placed on the jury verdict form.9
Article 966(G), therefore, prevents parties like LPG from attempting to
establish the dismissed party’s liability and deprives them of the
opportunity to appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.10
The Louisiana Legislature substantially revised article 966 in 2015,
which has led to a circuit split in the Louisiana appellate courts as to
whether an absurd result occurs when a co-defendant is dismissed on
summary judgment, the plaintiff does not appeal the co-defendant’s
dismissal, and the remaining defendants do not have the right to appeal the
dismissal.11 In Dixon, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit did not hear LPG’s
appeal of the Jackson defendants’ dismissal on summary judgment
because the court determined that the dismissal did not create an absurd
result.12 The Third Circuit in Mire v. Guidry, however, considered this
same scenario as an absurd result and gave co-defendants the opportunity
to appeal the summary judgment dismissal of a fellow co-defendant.13
Louisiana appellate courts, therefore, are split on whether co-defendants
have the opportunity to appeal a fellow co-defendant’s summary judgment
dismissal.14
Louisiana courts must apply laws that are clear and unambiguous as
written unless their application leads to absurd consequences.15 A law has
absurd consequences when the court determines “that the specific
application at issue arising from the literal wording [of the statute] would,
if judicially enforced, produce a factual result so inappropriate as to be

8. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966 (2018).
9. Id. art. 966(G).
10. Dixon, 223 So. 3d at 661.
11. Compare LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966 (2016), with id. art. 966 (2015);
Mire v. Guidry, 250 So. 3d 383 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2018); Dixon, 223 So. 3d at
658.
12. Dixon, 223 So. 3d at 661.
13. Mire, 250 So. 3d at 383.
14. Compare Dixon, 223 So. 3d 658, with Mire, 250 So. 3d 383.
15. LA. CIV. CODE art. 9 (2018).
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deemed outside the ‘purpose’ of the law.”16 Article 966(G) can lead to
absurd consequences when a co-defendant is not allowed to appeal the
summary judgment dismissal of a fellow co-defendant.17 A defendant has
the right to appeal adverse judgments and should not lose that right to
appeal, so absurd consequences result when a defendant loses the right to
appeal solely because the plaintiff elects not to appeal the summary
judgment dismissal of one of multiple co-defendants.18 The plaintiff and
defendant have significantly different interests in a lawsuit—mainly, a
defendant has a substantial interest in keeping other co-defendants in a
lawsuit for liability and comparative fault purposes.19 A defendant’s
ability to appeal an adverse judgment, therefore, should not depend on the
plaintiff’s decision to appeal the summary judgment dismissal of another
defendant to the plaintiff’s suit.
Part I of this Comment introduces the history of motions for summary
judgment, discusses the summary judgment process in Louisiana, and
articulates the goals of summary judgment. Part II discusses the most
recent revisions to article 966(G) and the implications surrounding these
revisions. Part III elaborates on the different interpretations of article
966(G) in the Louisiana appellate courts after these revisions. In
conclusion, Part IV proposes a recommendation to the Louisiana courts
and the Louisiana Legislature on how to implement and revise article
966(G) to ensure the protection of defendants’ appeal rights. Additionally,
Part IV will elaborate on how a trial court should proceed when a codefendant is erroneously dismissed from the suit on summary judgment.
I. WHAT IS A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND HOW DO COURTS
USE IT?
The scope and purpose of motions for summary judgment have
significantly evolved over time. Specifically, understanding a motion for
summary judgment’s current purpose, effect, and implementation is
fundamental in learning how Louisiana courts have become divided on
article 966(G)’s effect on a party’s appeal rights.

16. P. Raymond Lamonica & Jerry G. Jones, Legislative Law & Procedure,
in 20 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE § 7:4, 20 (3d ed. 2017).
17. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(G) (2018).
18. See Grimes v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 36 So. 3d 215, 217 (La. 2010); LA.
CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2083; Mire, 250 So. 3d at 383.
19. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(G) (limiting the remaining defendants’
ability to lower their liability by establishing the fault of the dismissed party).
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A. Summary Judgment: “Summary”
The motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used to
expedite the determination of a civil action without the need for trial.20
Summary judgment originated during the 19th century in England for the
same purpose as today’s summary judgment: to reduce delay in the court
system.21 Several U.S. states have enacted similar summary judgment
statutes to England, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP)
incorporated summary judgment into the federal courts in 1938.22 Initially,
litigants infrequently used summary judgment in the United States because
summary judgment imposed an onerous burden of proof on the moving
party.23 Additionally, summary judgment also appeared infrequently
because courts desired to protect a party’s right to a trial by jury.24 In 1986,
the United States Supreme Court in Celotex v. Catrett,25 Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc.,26 and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp.27 established the foundation for modern summary judgment
in courts across the United States.28
Under the framework established by these cases, any party to a suit
can bring a motion for summary judgment to challenge the existence or
legal sufficiency of another party’s claim or defense before trial.29 When
hearing a motion for summary judgment, the trial court reviews the
permitted evidence that the parties file in support or in opposition of the
motion.30 After reviewing the relevant evidence, the court determines
20. Garrett Filetti, 22nd Time’s the Charm: The 2015 Revisions to Summary
Judgment in Louisiana, 77 LA. L. REV. 479, 482–83 (2016).
21. Id.
22. FED. R. CIV. PROC. 56; Filetti, supra note 20, at 483.
23. The moving party is the party requesting summary judgment from the
court, and if the moving party was a defendant, summary judgment required the
defendant to show that a genuine issue of material fact existed by disproving an
essential element of the plaintiff’s claim. Filetti, supra note 20, at 483.
24. Id.
25. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
26. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
27. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 572
(1986).
28. Filetti, supra note 20, at 484.
29. Id. at 482.
30. In Louisiana, a party may only submit pleadings, memoranda, affidavits,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, certified medical records, written
stipulations, and admissions in support or in opposition of a motion for summary
judgment. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(A)(4) (2018). In federal court, parties
can only submit evidence in support or in opposition of a motion for summary
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whether a genuine issue of material fact exists that requires a trial on the
merits.31 The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of
proving that it is entitled to summary judgment,32 meaning that the moving
party must make a prima facie case33 that no genuine issue of material fact
exists and all essential elements of its claim are met.34 The Supreme Court
in Celotex, however, established that when the moving party does not bear
the burden of proof at trial, it does not have to fully disprove the nonmoving party’s claim.35 To prevail on summary judgment,36 the moving
party only has to show that the evidence does not support the non-moving
party’s claim.37 In either case, the burden shifts to the party opposing the
motion to provide evidence supporting its claim.38 The trial court, after
reviewing all of the evidence submitted by the parties, should only grant
the summary judgment motion if it determines, under a reasonable person
standard, that there is no genuine issue of material fact that precludes the
moving party’s desired conclusion. If the court makes this finding, the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.39
Following Celotex, Anderson, and Matsushita, summary judgment has
evolved into a case management tool used to narrow the issues disputed at
trial, reduce litigation costs, and promote judicial efficiency.40 Summary

judgment that is in a form that would be admissible at trial. FED. R. CIV. PROC.
56(c)(2).
31. A genuine issue of material fact exists when reasonable persons could
reach separate conclusions about the disputed facts of the case and could find in
favor of the non-moving party. Filetti, supra note 20, at 481.
32. Id. at 484.
33. To make a prima facie case, a party must produce “enough evidence to
allow the fact-trier to infer the fact at issue and rule in the party’s favor.” Prima
Facie Case, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
34. Id.
35. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324–26 (1986).
36. Prior to Celotex, when the moving party did not have the burden of proof
at trial, summary judgment required the party to show that a genuine issue of
material fact existed by disproving an essential element of the plaintiff’s claim.
Filetti, supra note 20, at 484.
37. Id. (providing that Celotex made bringing a summary judgment motion
easier).
38. Matsushita requires that the opposing party must specifically show that a
genuine issue of material fact exists instead of only showing that there is doubt
over whether the moving party’s claim is true. Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 572 (1986).
39. Filetti, supra note 20, at 483; LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(A)(3) (2018).
40. Filetti, supra note 20, at 482.

346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd 508

10/12/20 7:08 AM

2020]

COMMENT

1497

judgment, however, can deprive litigants of the right to trial by jury.41
Because of this concern, commentators believe that summary judgment
should not be a substitute for trial when genuine issues of material fact
exist.42
B. Summary Judgment in Louisiana
Louisiana enacted its first summary judgment statute in 1960.43 Article
966 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure—modeled after FRCP
Rule 56 (“Rule 56”)—codifies Louisiana’s summary judgment statute.44
Initially, article 966 was more restrictive than Rule 56 because it did not
allow for partial motions for summary judgment and prohibited summary
judgment in certain family law matters.45 The Louisiana Legislature
initially did not intend for the original article 966 to be used frequently;
instead, the legislature envisioned it as a preventive tool to discourage the
filing of frivolous claims.46 After Celotex, Anderson, and Matsushita,47 the
Louisiana Legislature revised article 966 in 1996 to modernize summary
judgment and to include the burden-shifting analysis established in those
cases.48 Additionally, the 1996 revisions explicitly provided that summary
judgment is the preferred method for resolving cases.49
The 1996 revisions contained conflicting provisions that divided the
Louisiana appellate courts over whether the use of summary judgment
changed in Louisiana.50 Some appellate courts analyzed motions for
41. Id.
42. Id. at 481.
43. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966 (1960).
44. Id. art. 966 cmt. a (1960); Filetti, supra note 20, at 486–87.
45. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure initially allowed
summary judgment to all plaintiffs and defendants regardless of the issue of the
case and allowed the courts to grant partial summary judgment. FED. R. CIV.
PROC. 56.
46. Filetti, supra note 20, at 486–87; LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art 966 cmt. a (1960).
47. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 572 (1986).
48. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966 (1996); Filetti, supra note 20, at 487.
49. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966 (1996); Filetti, supra note 20, at 487.
50. In addition to establishing the burden-shifting approach to summary
judgment, the 1996 revisions to article 966 included a provision stating:
“Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Article to the contrary, the burden
of proof shall remain with the mover.” LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(G) (1996).
This provision led to the Louisiana appellate courts’ split on how to apply article
966 after the 1996 revisions. Stephen Anthony Pitre, The Pelican State Amends
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summary judgment using the burden-shifting approach articulated in the
revisions.51 Other appellate courts, although acknowledging the change in
the summary judgment law, analyzed the motion for summary judgment
as they would have prior to the 1996 revisions.52
In response to this circuit split, article 966 underwent further revisions
in 1997, which more closely aligned Louisiana’s motion for summary
judgment to Rule 56.53 The repeated revisions made article 966
disorganized and confusing, complicating Louisiana’s summary judgment
process.54 Because of these issues and ongoing concern from attorneys, the
Louisiana Law Institute,55 per the request of the Louisiana Legislature,
appointed a subcommittee of lawyers, judges, and law professors to study
the use of summary judgment in Louisiana.56 The Louisiana Legislature
enacted the Louisiana Law Institute’s recommended revisions in 2015, and
the revisions took effect on January 1, 2016.57 Among the 2015 article 966
revisions, article 966(G)—which outlines the effects of a successful
motion for summary judgment on parties who remain in the suit—
underwent substantial changes.58

Summary Judgment: Recent Louisiana Jurisprudence Uncertain About
Legislative Intent, 43 LOY. L. REV. 97, 110–11 (1998); Filetti, supra note 20, at
488–89.
51. Filetti, supra note 20, at 488; see, e.g., Hayes v. Autin, 685 So. 2d 691
(La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1996) (electing to use the burden-shifting approach in a
motion for summary judgment).
52. Filetti, supra note 20, at 488–89.
53. The 1997 revisions to article 966 repealed Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 966(G). LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966 (1997).
54. Filetti, supra note 20, at 489–91.
55. The Louisiana Law Institute is “an official, advisory law revision
commission, law reform agency and legal research agency of the State of
Louisiana.” Purpose, LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, http://www.lsli.org
/purpose [https://perma.cc/64PM-T644] (last visited Mar. 26, 2019).
56. The subcommittee’s primary goal was to “reorganize article 966 so that
the provisions of the statute that address particular issues are set forth in a logical
and organized fashion.” Filetti, supra note 20, at 491–92 (quoting Donald Price,
An Update on Proposed Revisions to the Louisiana Summary Judgment Statutes,
in MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT: A REPORT TO THE LAW INSTITUTE,
PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE CHANGES TO ARTICLE 966, at 5 (2015), http://www.
lajudicialcollege.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/3Motions-for-Summary-Judg
ment.pdf [https://perma.cc/L2DV-GME9].
57. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966 (2016).
58. Id. art. 966(G) (2018).
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II. HISTORY OF LOUISIANA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ARTICLE 966(G)
A trial court’s summary judgment dismissal of a party implicates
article 966(G). Article 966(G) applies when the court grants a motion for
summary judgment and states that a party or non-party to the lawsuit is not
negligent or at fault, or it did not cause in whole or in part the injury or
harm alleged.59 When article 966(G) is applicable, the dismissed party
cannot be apportioned a percentage of the fault, and no party can refer to
the dismissed party’s fault nor introduce evidence attempting to establish
the dismissed party’s fault.60 Although the 2015 revisions to article 966(G)
seem straightforward, the 2015 expansion of article 966(G) has led to a
circuit split in the Louisiana appellate courts regarding whether the article
leads to absurd results.61
A. Origins of Article 966(G)
The Louisiana Legislature implemented article 966(G) into article 966
in 2010 after a few trial court judges inadvertently allowed parties
dismissed on summary judgment to appear on the jury verdict forms
despite the plaintiffs’ inability to collect judgment from the dismissed
parties.62 Article 966(G) clarified the summary judgment procedure used
in Louisiana courts by expressly providing that the plaintiff is not allowed
to recover from parties that the court, on summary judgment, determined
were not at fault for the harm alleged.63 Initially, article 966(G) gave courts
the option to consider a party or non-party in a subsequent allocation of
fault but required each court to prevent evidence of the dismissed party’s
fault and prohibit the issue of the party’s fault from being submitted to the
jury.64 Additionally, article 966(G) did not apply when a court granted a
motion for summary judgment solely when a party successfully asserted
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Dixon v. Gray Ins., 223 So. 3d 658, 659 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2017).
Mire v. Guidry, 250 So. 3d 383, 385–86 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2018).
62. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(F) (2010) (noting that subsection (F) was
renamed subsection (G) in 2013). Interview with William R. Corbett, Frank L.
Maraist Professor of Law and Wex S. Malone Professor of Law at the Paul M.
Hebert Law Center (Oct. 12, 2018).
63. Interview with Judge Holdridge, Judge for the Louisiana First Circuit
Court of Appeal (Oct. 11, 2018); Interview with William R. Corbett, Frank L.
Maraist Professor of Law and Wex S. Malone Professor of Law at the Paul M.
Hebert Law Center (Oct. 12, 2018).
64. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(F) (2010).
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an affirmative defense.65 The Louisiana Legislature revised article 966(G)
in 2012, removing the option from courts and prohibiting courts from
considering a party or non-party dismissed on summary judgment in a
subsequent allocation of fault.66 Also in 2012, the legislature added article
966(G)(2), which limited article 966(G) applicability to instances where
the trial court specified in its reasons for granting summary judgment that
article 966(G) applied.67 Article 966(G) did not undergo further revisions
until 2015.68
The 2015 revisions to article 966(G) removed section (G)(2) and the
affirmative defense exception from the article.69 After the 2015 revisions,70
article 966(G) applies when summary judgment is granted and the court
provides that a party or non-party to a suit is not negligent or at fault or,
either in whole or in part, cause the injury or harm alleged.71 When article
966(G) applies, no party can: (1) consider the dismissed party in a
subsequent allocation of fault; (2) submit evidence attempting to establish
its fault; (3) refer directly or indirectly to the dismissed party’s fault; or
(4) submit the dismissed party’s fault to the jury or include its name on the
jury verdict form.72
B. The Applicability of Article 966(G)
Article 966(G) primarily applies when a plaintiff sues multiple parties
for the same harm and the court only dismisses one or some of those
defendants on summary judgment.73 The lawsuit then proceeds without the
dismissed party, and article 966(G) prevents the fact-finder from
considering the dismissed party’s fault.74 Article 966(G) therefore has a
direct effect on fault allocation within Louisiana’s comparative fault
system.75
Louisiana is a pure comparative fault state, meaning that each party
who is at fault for the harm alleged is liable only for its allocated
65. Id.
66. Id. art. 966(F)(1) (2012).
67. Id. art. 966(F)(2).
68. Filetti, supra note 20, at 489–91.
69. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(G) (2016).
70. The Louisiana Legislature has not revised article 966(G) since the 2015
revisions to article 966. Id. art. 966(G) (2018).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.; see LA. CIV. CODE art. 2323(A) (2018).
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percentage of fault.76 Article 966(G) provides a reasonable limitation on
when attorneys can discuss a party’s fault at trial, thus limiting the use of
comparative fault.77 When the court dismisses a party on summary
judgment because the party is not at fault for the harm alleged, the court
should not hold the dismissed party liable for any potential damages to the
plaintiff.78 The dismissed party must be able to proceed from the litigation
without the concern of being potentially liable through a comparative fault
allocation.79 Additionally, a co-defendant who planned to argue the fault
of the now-dismissed party in its defense to the lawsuit can timely adjust
its strategy to defending the suit.80
After a court grants summary judgment under article 966, the
judgment becomes final, enabling the remaining parties to account for the
number of their co-parties and proceed accordingly.81 A final judgment is
immediately appealable when a party is dismissed from a lawsuit on
summary judgment.82 If a party fails or declines to timely appeal the trial
court’s ruling, the motion for summary judgment is considered to be
proper and true, and an appeal is unavailable on the summary judgment
ruling.83 When a granted summary judgment motion dismisses one of
several co-defendants, the plaintiff can typically fully recover from the
parties remaining in the suit.84 If the plaintiff can fully recover from the
parties remaining in the suit, the plaintiff has little interest in appealing the
summary judgment dismissal of one of several co-defendants; thus,
plaintiffs often do not appeal the co-defendant’s dismissal.85 For example,
a plaintiff sues three parties for the alleged harm and has estimated
damages of $1,000,000. Defendant A has an insurance policy with a limit
76. Id. art. 2323 (“all parties” includes the plaintiff, defendant, and nonparties to an action).
77. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(G) (2018).
78. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2323(A).
79. See generally LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966.
80. Id.
81. See generally Mire v. Guidry, 250 So. 3d 383, 384–85 (La. Ct. App. 3d
Cir. 2018); Dixon v. Gray Ins., 223 So. 3d 658, 659 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2017);
Mercer v. Lowe, 217 So. 3d 1235, 1237 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2017); White v. La.
Dept. Trans. & Dev., 258 So. 3d 11 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2017).
82. LA CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1915(A).
83. See id.
84. Interview with Judge Holdridge, Judge for the Louisiana First Circuit
Court of Appeal (Oct. 11, 2018); Grimes v. La. Medical Mut. Ins. Co. 36 So. 3d
215, 217 (La. 2010); Mire, 250 So. 3d at 384–85; Dixon, 223 So. 3d at 659;
Mercer, 217 So. 3d at 1237; White, 258 So. 3d 11.
85. Interview with Judge Holdridge, Judge for the Louisiana First Circuit
Court of Appeal (Oct. 11, 2018).
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of $50,000; defendants B and C each have $1,000,000 limits in their
insurance policies. If defendant A is dismissed on summary judgment, the
plaintiff can still fully recover from either defendant B or C; thus, the
plaintiff likely will not appeal defendant A’s summary judgment
dismissal. Louisiana appellate courts are divided over how to handle the
appeal rights of the co-defendants who are left in the suit after the plaintiff
does not appeal the dismissal of a co-defendant on summary judgment.86
III. LOUISIANA COURTS’ INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 966(G)
Louisiana appellate courts are split on the issue of whether a defendant
can appeal a co-defendant’s dismissal on summary judgment when the
plaintiff does not appeal the co-defendant’s dismissal.87 Article 966(G) is
silent on whether the provisions of the article are subject to an appeal by
any party.88 Additionally, the Third Circuit courts are split on whether a
co-defendant has the right to appeal a fellow co-defendant’s dismissal and
has permitted co-defendants the right to appeal in some cases, while
denying co-defendants this right in other cases.89 The Second Circuit has
avoided the issue of whether a co-defendant has the right to appeal but has
heard a co-defendant’s appeal on the merits, therefore implicitly giving a
co-defendant appeal rights.90 The Fifth Circuit, however, does not give the
co-defendant the right to appeal because it interpreted article 966(G) as
clear and unambiguous.91
A. The Third Circuit in Mire v. Guidry and White v. Louisiana
Department of Transportation and Development
The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal is split within the circuit,
with conflicting opinions on whether co-defendants can appeal the
summary judgment dismissal of a fellow co-defendant when the plaintiff
elects not to appeal that co-defendant’s dismissal.92 In Mire v. Guidry, after
sustaining injuries in a three-car pileup, Gerald Mire sued Tricia Sam and
Brandon Guidry, the drivers of the second and third cars, respectively.93
86. Mire, 250 So. 3d 383; Dixon, 223 So. 3d 658; Mercer, 217 So. 3d 1235.
87. Id.
88. LA CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966 (G) (2016).
89. Mire, 250 So. 3d 383; White, 258 So. 3d 11.
90. Mercer, 217 So. 3d at 1237.
91. Dixon, 223 So. 3d at 659.
92. Mire, 250 So. 3d 383; White, 258 So. 3d 11.
93. Mire sued the following parties in addition to Sam and Guidry: (1) EAN
Holdings, LLC, the owner of Sam’s vehicle; (2) National Automotive Insurance
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Sam answered the lawsuit and claimed that Guidry was wholly at fault for
the accident.94 Guidry’s answer specifically alleged Sam’s third-party fault
and, in the alternative, Sam’s comparative fault.95 Sam then filed a motion
for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Mire’s claims against her
because Mire testified that he only felt one impact during the car
accident.96 Guidry opposed Sam’s motion for summary judgment,
contending that a genuine issue of material fact existed because Mire told
his physicians that he felt “two different and distinct impacts.”97 The trial
court granted Sam’s motion for summary judgment.98 Mire chose not to
appeal Sam’s dismissal; Guidry was the only party to appeal Sam’s
dismissal.99
On appeal, the Third Circuit first concluded that under the current
version of article 966(G), if the plaintiff does not appeal the trial court’s
summary judgment dismissal of one of several co-defendants, the
judgment becomes final and cannot be appealed by any other party to the
suit.100 Nevertheless, the Third Circuit then decided that it would be an
absurd result if Guidry could not appeal the summary judgment dismissal
of Sam and proceeded to hear Guidry’s appeal on the merits.101
The Mire court first determined that the 2015 revisions to article
966(G) changed prior law in procedurally similar situations, such as
Grimes v. Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Co.102 Grimes established
Company, Sam’s insurer; (3) Butcher Air Conditioning, Inc., Guidry’s employer,
because Guidry was driving a car owned by his employer; and (4) State National
Insurance Company, Inc., insurer of Butcher Air Conditioning and Guidry. Mire,
250 So. 3d at 384.
94. “Sam” herein refers to both Sam and National Automotive Insurance
Company. EAN Holdings was dismissed from the suit without prejudice, and no
party appealed its dismissal. Id. at 384–85.
95. “Guidry” herein refers to Guidry, Butcher Air Conditioning, and State
National Insurance. Butcher Air Conditioning and State National answered the
petition first, followed by Guidry. Each party answered the suit the same way. Id.
at 385.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 384–385.
98. Id. at 385.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 385–87. When the court determines that a co-defendant does not have
a right to appeal, the appellate court does not hear the co-defendant’s appeal on
whether a fellow co-defendant was erroneously dismissed from the case on
summary judgment. Dixon v. Gray Ins., 223 So. 3d 658 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2017).
102. Mire, 250 So. 3d at 386; Grimes v. La. Medical Mut. Ins. Co., 36 So. 3d
215, 217 (La. 2010).
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that a party can generally only appeal the portions of a judgment that are
adverse to it.103 Under article 966(G), the Mire trial court’s summary
judgment dismissal of the Sam defendants adversely affected the Guidry
defendants despite Sam bringing the motion for summary judgment in
response to Mire’s suit.104 Sam’s dismissal directly affected how much
liability a party could cast against Guidry for Mire’s injuries because
Guidry pled the third-party fault and, in the alternative, the comparative
fault of Sam.105 The Mire court found that prior to the 2015 revisions, the
Guidry defendants would have been able to appeal Sam’s summary
judgment dismissal because the judgment was adverse to them and
because they would have been within the affirmative defense exception to
article 966(G).106 The court, therefore, determined that under prior
precedent to the 2015 revision, it would be an absurd result to prevent
Guidry from having the right to plead affirmative defenses to the factfinder without the opportunity to appeal.107
Furthermore, the court stated that under article 2086, a person who
could have intervened into the original suit may appeal even if no other
party has taken an appeal.108 The Third Circuit found it illogical for a nonparty to be allowed to appeal while Guidry, a party to the suit, was
forbidden.109 For these reasons, the court concluded that disallowing the
Guidry defendants the right to appeal an adverse judgment against them
and then to not allow the Guidry defendants to exercise their right at trial
to argue the third-party fault or comparative fault of Sam yields an absurd
result.110 Upon resolving whether Guidry had the right to appeal, the Third
Circuit heard the Guidry defendants’ appeal on the merits and reversed the
trial court’s summary judgment dismissal of Sam because a genuine issue
103. Grimes, 36 So. 3d at 217.
104. Mire, 250 So. 3d at 385–86.
105. Id. at 384–86.
106. Article 966(G) would not have applied, and Guidry would have been
under the affirmative defense exception that existed prior to the 2015 revisions of
article 966(G) because article 1031 allows Guidry to plead third-party affirmative
defenses or the comparative fault of Sam because Guidry pled an allowed
incidental demand against a co-party. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1031 (2018);
Mire, 250 So. 3d at 385–86; see LA CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1005 (stating what
constitutes an affirmative defense). Guidry would only have to meet the Grimes
test that Sam’s dismissal on summary judgment was adverse to him. Mire, 250
So. 3d at 385–86; LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(G) (2015); Grimes, 36 So. 3d at
217.
107. Mire, 250 So. 3d at 385–87.
108. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2086 (2018).
109. Mire, 250 So. 3d at 386.
110. Id.
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of material fact existed on whether Mire felt one or two impacts.111 Other
Louisiana appellate courts, including another panel in the Third Circuit,
however, have determined that similar factual situations to Mire do not
lead to absurd results and have denied a co-defendant the right to appeal
the summary judgment dismissal of a fellow co-defendant.112
Seven months before Mire, the Third Circuit in White v. Louisiana
Department of Transportation and Development, a case that is
procedurally identical to Mire, did not permit a co-defendant to appeal a
fellow co-defendant’s summary judgment dismissal when the plaintiff did
not to appeal.113 White centered on Gerald White’s injuries suffered when
a tree fell on his car during a thunderstorm.114 The tree fell from the
Manguns’ property onto the state highway, which was maintained by the
Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (“DOTD”).115
The Whites116 sued: (1) Garold and Mickey Mangun, the owners of the
house where the tree was rooted, along with their insurance providers,
Church Mutual and Safeco (collectively, the “Manguns”); (2) DOTD; and
(3) the City of Alexandria, alleging against each defendant negligence for
failure to maintain, inspect, and remove the damaged tree.117
The Manguns118 answered, contending that they had no actual or
constructive notice of the defective tree, and then filed a motion for
summary judgment asserting that they had no knowledge of the tree’s
defect because they did not mow the state highway.119 DOTD opposed the
motion for summary judgment, but the trial court granted summary
judgment dismissal in favor of the Manguns.120 The Whites chose not to

111. Id.
112. White v. La. Dept. Trans. & Dev., 258 So. 3d 11 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
2017); Dixon v. Gray Ins., 223 So. 3d 658 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2017).
113. White, 258 So. 3d 11. Mire did not cite White as authority when
determining that article 966(G) leads to absurd results. Mire, 250 So. 3d 383.
114. White, 258 So. 3d at 12.
115. Id.
116. Gerald White brought suit for general and special damages for injuries
suffered from the accident. His wife also brought a loss of consortium claim
against all of the parties that he sued. Gerald White and his wife are referred to
hereinafter as “the Whites.” Id.
117. The City of Alexandria was dismissed on summary judgment, and no other
party appealed because DOTD was responsible for maintaining the rights-of-way
and the City of Alexandria did not have notice of the defective tree. Id.
118. “The Manguns” refers to Garold and Mickey Mangun, Church Mutual,
and Safeco.
119. White, 258 So. 3d at 13.
120. Id.
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appeal, and DOTD was the only party to appeal the Manguns’ summary
judgment dismissal.121
In its appeal, DOTD asserted that the Manguns were negligent in
failing to discover and remove the defective tree.122 Additionally, DOTD
contended that it should be able to introduce evidence of the Manguns’
fault at trial for comparative fault purposes, even if the Manguns remained
dismissed from the suit, because a genuine issue of material fact existed.123
The Third Circuit found that it had no authority to hear DOTD’s appeal on
the merits because when the Whites chose not to appeal the Manguns’
dismissal, a final judgment was entered between the Whites and the
Manguns.124 Furthermore, the court reasoned that article 966(G)’s use of
comparative fault clarifies Louisiana’s comparative fault principles and
“must prevail as a latter introduced amendment and as a clarification of
the legislature’s intent on the issue of comparative fault.”125 DOTD thus
could not introduce evidence of the Manguns’ fault throughout the
remainder of the lawsuit.126 The Mire court did not discuss White when
allowing Guidry to appeal on the merits. Therefore, it is uncertain how the
Third Circuit would rule in the future when faced with cases containing
article 966(G) implications.127
B. The Fifth Circuit’s Interpretation of Article 966(G) in Dixon v. Gray
Insurance Co.
The Fifth Circuit examined article 966(G) in Dixon v. Gray Insurance
Co. and concluded that article 966(G) does not lead to absurd results when
a co-defendant is not given the right to appeal a fellow co-defendant’s
summary judgment dismissal.128 In Dixon, Tobias Dixon sued multiple
parties after he was hit from behind by Devyn Allen and was ejected from
his motorcycle and then subsequently run over by Patrick Jackson.129 LPG,
Allen’s employer, was the only party to appeal the Jackson defendants’
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. DOTD claimed that a genuine issue of material fact existed over whether
the Manguns: (1) exercised reasonable care over their property; (2) could have
detected the defective tree; and (3) could have remedied the defect by exercising
reasonable care. Id.
124. Id. at 14.
125. Id. at 15–16.
126. Id. at 14–15.
127. Mire v. Guidry, 250 So. 3d 383 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2018).
128. Dixon v. Gray Ins., 223 So. 3d 658 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2017).
129. See Dixon, 223 So. 3d at 659–60.
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summary judgment dismissal; in this appeal, LPG contended the existence
of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Dixon was lying on the
pavement.130
The Fifth Circuit determined that after Dixon, the plaintiff, did not
appeal the summary judgment dismissal of Jackson, the judgment became
final between Dixon and Jackson.131 The court, therefore, had no authority
to determine the appropriateness of Jackson’s summary judgment
dismissal, which resulted in LPG’s inability to appeal Jackson’s summary
judgment dismissal.132 First, the court determined that the revisions to
article 966(G) legislatively overruled Grimes v. Louisiana Medical Mutual
Insurance Co. because the trial court is required to follow article 966(G)
when a party is dismissed on summary judgment.133 Furthermore, the court
concluded that article 966(G) merely serves as a limit on when a party can
appeal an adverse judgment.134 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that
there would be an absurd result if LPG was allowed to appeal Jackson’s
dismissal because article 966(G) would only restrict parties who did not
appeal Jackson’s summary judgment dismissal and would not restrict the
parties who successfully appealed.135 Under this scenario that created,
according to the court, an absurd result, article 966(G) would only restrict
Dixon and not LPG.136 The Fifth Circuit viewed this absurd result137 as
counter to article 966(G)’s legislative intent.138 The court, therefore,
overturned the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and concluded that
LPG’s appeal lacked merit and article 966(G) would restrict LPG until the
lawsuit’s resolution.139

130. Id. at 660.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Grimes established that a party may “‘appeal the portions of the judgment
that were adverse to [that party],’ but not ‘the portions of the judgment that were
adverse to the plaintiff.’” Grimes v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 36 So. 3d 215, 217
(La. 2010) (citing Nunez v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 780 So. 2d 348, 349 (La.
2001)); Dixon, 223 So. 3d at 660–61.
134. Dixon, 223 So. 3d at 660–61.
135. Id. at 661.
136. LPG would have been able to argue and present evidence of Jackson’s
percentage of the fault to Dixon, while article 966(G) would have prevented
Dixon. Id.
137. Id.
138. According to the Dixon court, article 966(G)’s legislative intent makes
the article applicable in all cases, as soon as the ruling on a motion for summary
judgment becomes a final judgment. Id.
139. Id.
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C. How Other Louisiana Appellate Courts Have Addressed Article
966(G)
Mire and Dixon are the only two Louisiana appellate cases to discuss
and determine whether article 966(G) leads to absurd results.140 In White,
the Third Circuit did not discuss whether article 966(G) leads to absurd
results in reaching its conclusion. The Second Circuit, without addressing
whether an article 966(G) issue exists, has heard appeals from codefendants on the validity of a fellow co-defendant’s dismissal on
summary judgment despite the plaintiff choosing not to appeal that party’s
dismissal.141 In Mercer v. Lowe, the mother of a deceased child who was
a suspected victim of child abuse sued multiple parties for wrongful death
and survival individually and on behalf of her deceased child.142 Mercer
sued nine parties, including the Department of Child and Family Services
(“DCFS”), the Bossier Parish Sheriff’s Office (“BPSO”), and Bossier
Parish Sheriff’s Office Detective McKay.143 BPSO and Detective McKay
filed motions for summary judgment, and only DCFS and Mercer filed
oppositions.144 The Second Circuit granted BPSO’s and Detective
McKay’s motions for summary judgment, and only DCFS appealed.145
The Second Circuit did not discuss whether DCFS had the right to
appeal under article 966(G) or whether there was a final judgment for
Mercer, BPSO, and Detective McKay.146 The court instead discussed
whether DCFS’s appeal had merit and cited article 966(G) as an applicable
provision for determining the appropriateness of summary judgment.147
The Mercer case in the Second Circuit was procedurally similar to Mire,
White, and Dixon, and the Second Circuit proceeded to hear the appeal of
a motion for summary judgment on the merits without discussing whether

140. White did not mention whether article 966(G) leads to absurd results, but
the court cited Dixon as authority for why it did not hear DOTD’s appeal on the
merits. White v. La. Dept. Trans. & Dev., 258 So. 3d 11, 13–14 (La. Ct. App. 3d
Cir. 2017). Dixon, 223 So. 3d 658; Mire v. Guidry, 250 So. 3d 383, 385–86 (La.
Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2018).
141. Mercer v. Lowe, 217 So. 3d 1235, 1237 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2017).
142. Id.
143. Mercer only opposed the motion to the extent that if BPSO and Detective
McKay were dismissed on summary judgment, no evidence of either party’s fault
should be considered at trial. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1238; LA. CODE. CIV. PROC. art. 966(G) (2017).
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article 966(G) limits a party’s right to appeal.148 Mercer likely establishes
that the Second Circuit would follow Mire instead of Dixon or White
because the court heard DCFS’s appeal on the merits after a final judgment
between Mercer and the parties dismissed on summary judgment.149 As
the consideration of these cases shows, Louisiana appellate courts are
widely divided on whether article 966(G) affects a party’s ability to appeal
a co-defendant’s dismissal on summary judgment.150
IV. HOW COURTS SHOULD HANDLE APPEAL RIGHTS UNDER
ARTICLE 966(G)
Louisiana appellate courts are divided on whether article 966(G) leads
to absurd results when a court prevents a defendant from appealing the
dismissal of a fellow co-defendant because the plaintiff does not appeal
that co-defendant’s dismissal.151 A dismissal of a party on a summary
judgment motion is, however, a final judgment that is immediately
appealable.152 A co-defendant, therefore, should have the right to appeal
this judgment because article 966(G) does not expressly limit a codefendant’s right to appeal.153 Additionally, if Louisiana appellate courts
determine that the trial court erred in dismissing the co-defendant on
summary judgment, the trial court should follow a precise procedure upon
remand to ensure that each party’s rights are protected.154

148. Mercer, 217 So. 3d at 1238; Mire v. Guidry 250 So. 3d 383 (La. Ct. App.
3d Cir. 2018); White v. La. Dept. Trans. & Dev., 258 So. 3d 11 (La. Ct. App. 3d
Cir. 2017); Dixon v. Gray Ins., 223 So. 3d 658 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2017).
149. In Mire, the court heard Guidry’s appeal on the merits, while in White and
Dixon the court did not hear the parties’ appeals on the merits because of article
966(G). Mercer, 217 So. 3d at 1238; Mire, 250 So. 3d 383; White, 258 So. 3d 11;
Dixon, 223 So. 3d. 658.
150. Mercer, 217 So. 3d at 1238; Mire, 250 So. 3d 383; White, 258 So. 3d 11;
Dixon, 223 So. 3d. 658.
151. See Mire, 250 So. 3d at 385–86; Dixon, 223 So. 3d. at 660–61; Mercer,
217 So. 3d 1235; White, 258 So. 3d 11.
152. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2083(A) (2018); id. art. 1915.
153. Dixon, 223 So. 3d at 664 (Gravois, J., dissenting).
154. See generally id. at 662–65 (Gravois, J., dissenting).
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A. Article 966(G) Leads to Absurd Results When a Defendant Is Not
Allowed to Appeal the Summary Judgment Dismissal of One of Several
Co-Defendants
When applicable, article 966(G) can substantially impact a lawsuit.155
At trial, article 966(G) restricts a co-defendant who is not allowed to
appeal a fellow co-defendant’s summary judgment dismissal.156 The
substantial restrictions of article 966(G) can affect a defendant’s
liability.157 When the court dismisses a defendant on summary judgment,
the court effectively states that no reasonable jury could reach the
conclusion that the defendant is liable to the plaintiff for the alleged
harm.158 After the court reaches this conclusion, and each party’s right to
appeal has terminated, article 966(G)’s restrictions are reasonable on the
parties remaining in the lawsuit because it is unfair to the plaintiff to
discuss a dismissed party at trial and to include that party on the jury
verdict form.159 By restricting all references to the dismissed party for the
remainder of the lawsuit, article 966(G) promotes efficiency because the
parties can only discuss the potential liability of parties who can be placed
on the jury verdict form.160
Following civil law interpretation, courts should apply Louisiana
statutes as written if they are “clear and unambiguous and [their]
application does not lead to absurd consequences.”161 If article 966(G) is
“clear and unambiguous,” then it “shall be applied as written and no
further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the
legislature.”162 The language of article 966(G) is straightforward and
unambiguous163 because all parties understand the implications when
article 966(G) is applicable to a lawsuit.164 For article 966(G) to lead to
155. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(G).
156. Id.
157. See id.
158. See id. art. 966.
159. Once a plaintiff elects not to appeal the summary judgment dismissal of
a party, it cannot recover from that party because a final judgment of dismissal
was entered into between the plaintiff and dismissed party. LA. CODE CIV. PROC.
art. 1915; id. art. 2083(A); Dixon v. Gray Ins., 223 So. 3d 658, 664 (La. Ct. App.
5th Cir. 2017) (Gravois, J., dissenting).
160. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(G).
161. LA. CIV. CODE art. 9 (2018).
162. Id.
163. Dixon, 223 So. 3d at 661; Mire v. Guidry 250 So. 3d 383, 386 (La. Ct.
App. 3d Cir. 2018).
164. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(G) (stating the restrictions on references to
parties dismissed on summary judgment by the parties remaining in the suit).
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absurd results, the court must determine that “the specific application at
issue arising from the literal wording would, if judicially enforced,
produce a factual result so inappropriate as to be deemed outside of the
‘purpose’ of the law.”165 Article 966(G) leads to absurd results when a codefendant is prevented from appealing the summary judgment dismissal
of a fellow co-defendant because a party’s appeal rights should include the
right to appeal adverse judgments and not depend on whether the plaintiff
elects to appeal the dismissed party’s dismissal.166
Prior to the 2015 revisions to article 966(G), Grimes governed factual
situations similar to the Mire, White, Dixon, and Mercer cases.167 In
Grimes, complications during labor led to injuries of Grimes’s newborn
daughter.168 Grimes, individually and on behalf of her newborn daughter,
and Paul Walker, the newborn child’s father, (collectively, “Grimes”) filed
a medical malpractice suit against: (1) Dr. Solar, Grimes’s obstetrician
during labor; (2) Dr. Andrus, Grimes’s prenatal obstetrician; (3) Woman’s
Hospital, where Grimes gave birth to her daughter;169 and (4) Louisiana
Medical Mutual Insurance Company.170 Woman’s Hospital filed for
dismissal on summary judgment, and the trial court granted its motion.171
Despite all of the other defendants choosing to appeal Woman’s Hospital’s
summary judgment dismissal, Grimes elected not to appeal.172
On appeal, the First Circuit concluded that the trial court erroneously
dismissed Woman’s Hospital on summary judgment.173 Grimes, therefore,
could not recover from Woman’s Hospital because the court entered a final
judgment between Grimes and Woman’s Hospital when Grimes chose not
to appeal Woman’s Hospital’s summary judgment dismissal. 174 All of the
defendants who successfully appealed Woman’s Hospital’s dismissal filed
a writ of certiorari to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which the Court
granted to address whether the defendants who successfully appealed
Woman’s Hospital’s summary judgment dismissal could attempt to prove
the comparative fault of Woman’s Hospital at the subsequent trial despite
165. Lamonica & Jones, supra note 16.
166. Grimes v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 36 So. 3d 215, 217 (La. 2010).
167. Id.; White v. La. Dept. Trans. & Dev., 258 So. 3d 11 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
2017); Dixon, 223 So. 3d 658; Mire, 250 So. 3d 383.
168. Grimes, 36 So. 3d at 216.
169. Id. at 215.
170. Id. at 216.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Grimes v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 29 So. 3d 505, 510 (La. Ct. App. 1st
Cir. 2009).
174. Grimes, 36 So. 3d at 217.
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Grimes being prevented from recovering from Woman’s Hospital.175 The
Louisiana Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeal determined that
Woman’s Hospital was erroneously dismissed on summary judgment.176
Thus, despite there being a final judgment between Grimes and Woman’s
Hospital, at the subsequent trial, the appealing defendants would be
allowed to attempt to establish the comparative fault of Woman’s
Hospital.177 The Supreme Court determined that an inability to prove the
comparative fault of Woman’s Hospital would be an adverse effect to the
appealing defendants because if the defendants could successfully argue
Woman’s Hospital’s comparative fault, their liability could be reduced.178
On remand, therefore, the co-defendants could only reduce their potential
liability to Grimes by the percentage of fault issued to Woman’s
Hospital.179 Grimes, thus, allows a party to appeal any adverse portions of
a judgment to them.180 Courts, however, have determined that article
966(G) overruled Grimes.181
Mire and Dixon both concluded that the 2015 revisions to article
966(G) overruled Grimes to the extent that Grimes conflicts with article
966(G).182 Article 966(G) does not address the appealability of summary
judgment motions.183 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2083(A)
allows final judgments to be “appealable in all cases in which appeals are
given by law.”184 Article 1915 provides that a motion for summary
judgment dismissing a party is an immediately appealable final judgment
and gives parties the right to appeal a co-party’s summary judgment
dismissal per article 2083(A).185 Without any expression in article 966(G)
limiting a party’s ability to appeal a motion for summary judgment when
article 966(G) applies, the right to appeal should be governed by articles
1915(A) and 2083(A). These articles would allow co-defendants to appeal
the dismissal of a fellow co-defendant on summary judgment when the

175. Id. at 216.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 217.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 215.
181. Mire v. Guidry, 250 So. 3d 383 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2018); Dixon v.
Gray Ins., 223 So. 3d 658 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2017).
182. Mire, 250 So. 3d at 383; Dixon, 223 So. 3d 658; Grimes, 36 So. 3d at 215.
183. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(G) (2018); Dixon, 223 So. 3d at 664
(Gravois, J., dissenting).
184. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2083(A).
185. Id. art. 1915; Dixon, 223 So. 3d at 664 (Gravois, J., dissenting).
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plaintiff does not appeal.186 Grimes, however, would still limit the
appealing co-defendant; the appealing co-defendant could only appeal the
portions of the summary judgment motion that are adverse to it.187
When a plaintiff files suit against multiple defendants, the assumption
is that the plaintiff believes that all of the co-defendants are potentially
liable for the alleged harm.188 If summary judgment dismisses a codefendant, the remaining co-defendants can appeal the dismissal of that
fellow co-defendant because it could potentially be liable for a portion, if
not all, of the harm alleged by the plaintiff.189 If the court erroneously
dismisses the co-defendant from the suit, at trial, the other co-defendants,
after successfully appealing their fellow co-defendant’s dismissal, would
attempt to prove the fault of the formerly dismissed co-defendant to the
plaintiff.190 If, however, the co-defendant is properly dismissed from the
suit, article 966(G) would be in effect, and its restrictions would limit the
remaining co-defendants.191 Article 966(G), therefore, has an adverse
effect on the co-defendants remaining in the suit because of its impacts on
the amount of liability the co-defendants will have to the plaintiff.192
Additionally, article 966(G) does not have a provision preventing codefendants from appealing.193 The article’s implications, along with article
1915 and 2083(A) allowing a party to appeal a motion for summary
judgment ruling, make it important to allow a co-defendant to appeal
another co-defendant’s summary judgment dismissal.194 Furthermore,
allowing this appeal will help protect the accuracy and fairness of the
proceedings by ensuring that only parties who no reasonable jury could
find to be at fault are dismissed on summary judgment.195 When a codefendant cannot appeal the summary judgment dismissal of a fellow codefendant, an absurd result occurs because a co-defendant’s appeal rights
186. See Dixon, 223 So. 3d at 664 (Gravois, J., dissenting).
187. Id.; Grimes, 36 So. 3d at 217.
188. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 863(B)(3).
189. See Mire v. Guidry, 250 So. 3d 383 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2018); Dixon,
223 So. 3d at 658; White v. La. Dept. Trans. & Dev., 258 So. 3d 11 (La. Ct. App.
3d Cir. 2017); Grimes, 36 So. 3d at 215.
190. See Mire, 250 So. 3d at 384–86.
191. See generally Mire, 250 So. 3d at 383; Dixon, 223 So. 3d at 658; White,
258 So. 3d at 11; Grimes, 36 So. 3d at 215.
192. Dixon, 223 So. 3d at 664 (Gravois, J., dissenting).
193. LA CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(G) (2018).
194. Id. arts. 966(G), 1915; 2083(A); Dixon, 223 So. 3d at 664 (Gravois, J.,
dissenting).
195. In both cases, the court did not hear the summary judgment dismissal of a
co-defendant on the merits. See Dixon, 223 So. 3d at 658; White, 258 So. 3d at 11.
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are not limited under article 966(G) and the 2015 revisions to article
966(G) do not legislatively override Grimes.196 The Louisiana appellate
courts and the Louisiana Legislature can solve this problem to ensure that
defendants keep their right to appeal.
B. Judicial and Legislative Solution
To solve this problem—and adhere to the Grimes opinion—the
Louisiana appellate courts must consider a co-defendant’s appeal of the
dismissal of a fellow co-defendant on the merits regardless of whether the
plaintiff appeals the dismissal.197 This approach would ensure that the
appeal rights of all parties are properly protected when a co-party is
dismissed on summary judgment and that no party will be subject to the
limits imposed by article 966(G) without the opportunity to appeal.198
The Louisiana Legislature could solve this problem by codifying the
appeal rights of all parties in a suit by adding a provision to article 966(G)
that states:
When the court grants a motion for summary judgment in
accordance with the provisions of this Article, that a party or
non-party is not negligent, is not at fault, or did not cause in whole
or in part the injury or harm alleged, that party or non-party shall
not be considered in any subsequent allocation of fault. Evidence
shall not be admitted at trial to establish the fault of that party or
non-party. During the course of the trial, no party or person shall
refer directly or indirectly to any such fault, nor shall that party or
non-party’s fault be submitted to the jury or included on the jury
verdict form. The provisions of this subsection are subject to any
timely appeal allowed by law.199
This provision would expressly permit all parties to a lawsuit to appeal the
dismissal of a co-party on summary judgment because articles 1915 and
2083(A) allow appeals of a motion for summary judgment.200 The
suggested provision, therefore, specifically allows a defendant to timely
appeal the dismissal of a co-defendant on summary judgment.201 The
196. Dixon, 223 So. 3d at 664 (Gravois, J., dissenting); LA. CODE CIV. PROC.
art. 966(G); Grimes, 36 So. 3d at 215.
197. Grimes, 36 So. 3d 215; See generally Mire v. Guidry, 250 So. 3d 383 (La.
Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2018).
198. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. arts. 1915, 2083(A), 966(G).
199. See generally Dixon, 223 So. 3d at 664 (Gravois, J., dissenting).
200. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. arts. 1915, 2083(A).
201. Id.

346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd 526

10/12/20 7:08 AM

2020]

COMMENT

1515

appellate courts hearing a co-defendant’s appeal on the merits regardless
of whether the plaintiff chooses to appeal a co-defendant’s summary
judgment dismissal, in conjunction with this additional provision to article
966(G), achieves the same goal by ensuring that a co-defendant’s appeal
rights do not depend on whether the plaintiff appeals a summary judgment
dismissal of another co-defendant.
C. Impact of Giving Co-Defendants the Right to Appeal
After hearing a co-defendant’s appeal of the summary judgment
dismissal of another co-defendant despite the plaintiff not appealing that
co-defendant’s dismissal, a Louisiana appellate court will remand the case
if it concludes that the trial court erroneously dismissed the co-defendant
on summary judgment. Upon remand, there must be an appropriate
method for how the trial court should treat the formerly dismissed party
and to determine who can attempt to establish the dismissed party’s fault.
Louisiana courts have addressed different ways of how to treat the
formerly dismissed party.202
In Stafford v. Exxon Mobile Corp., the Louisiana First Circuit Court
of Appeal followed Grimes and established that if an appellate court
reverses a party’s summary judgment dismissal, that party would not owe
the plaintiff any damages upon remand because the plaintiff did not appeal
that party’s summary judgment dismissal.203 The court stated, however,
that if the co-defendants successfully appealed, they could attempt to
prove that the previously dismissed party was liable to the plaintiff to
lower the co-defendants’ liability despite the plaintiff not being able to
recover from the once-dismissed party.204
Likewise, in Dixon, Judge Gravois’s dissent expressed the belief that
LPG should have been permitted to appeal the dismissal of the Jackson
defendants on the merits.205 Additionally, if LPG’s appeal was successful,
Judge Gravois provided a guide for the trial court on how to handle article
966(G).206 Judge Gravois believed that the trial court should allow the
party who successfully appealed the dismissal, LPG,207 to have the
opportunity to prove the fault of the Jackson defendants.208 Further, Judge
202. Stafford v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 212 So. 3d 1257, 1263 (La. Ct. App. 1st
Cir. 2017); Dixon, 223 So. 3d at 664 (Gravois, J., dissenting).
203. Stafford, 212 So. 3d at 1263; Grimes, 36 So. 3d at 217.
204. Stafford, 212 So. 3d at 1263.
205. Dixon, 223 So. 3d at 664 (Gravois, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 664 n.8 (Gravois, J., dissenting).
207. See supra Introduction, Section III.B.
208. Dixon, 223 So. 3d at 664 n.8 (Gravois, J., dissenting).
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Gravois reasoned that if LPG successfully proved the fault of the Jackson
defendants, LPG would have its own fault reduced pursuant to Louisiana’s
comparative fault scheme.209 Moreover, like in Grimes and Stafford, the
plaintiff who did not appeal—in this case, Dixon—would not be able to
recover from the co-defendant—Jackson—because the court entered a
final judgment when Dixon did not appeal Jackson’s summary judgment
dismissal, implicating article 966(G).210
Each of these cases establishes that upon the formerly dismissed party
returning to the suit, the plaintiff should not be able to recover from that
party.211 Additionally, the parties who successfully appealed should be
able to attempt to prove the formerly dismissed party’s fault.212 When the
plaintiff does not appeal the summary judgment dismissal of one of several
co-defendants, the plaintiff concedes that it will not recover from that party
for the harm alleged.213 The co-defendant returning to the suit does not
change the fact that the plaintiff conceded that it will not recover from that
particular co-defendant.214 Article 966(G), therefore, still applies between
the plaintiff and the formerly dismissed co-defendant, meaning that the
formerly dismissed co-defendant should not be liable to the plaintiff for
any amount of liability, even if another party can establish the formerly
dismissed co-defendant’s fault.215 Further, if at trial, the co-defendant that
successfully appealed the formerly dismissed party’s summary judgment
dismissal could prove that party’s fault, the successful co-defendant
should have its fault reduced under Louisiana’s comparative fault
scheme.216 Louisiana appellate courts, therefore, should follow this
procedure when a co-defendant is successful in appealing the summary
judgment dismissal of a fellow co-defendant and the plaintiff did not
appeal the summary judgment motion.217

209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Stafford v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 212 So. 3d 1257, 1263 (La. Ct. App. 1st
Cir. 2017); Grimes v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 36 So. 3d 215, 217 (La. 2010);
Dixon, 223 So. 3d at 664 n.8 (Gravois, J., dissenting).
212. Id.
213. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(G) (2018).
214. See generally id.
215. See Stafford, 212 So. 3d at 1263; Grimes, 36 So. 3d at 217; Dixon, 223
So. 3d at 664 n.8 (Gravois, J., dissenting).
216. See Stafford, 212 So. 3d at 1263; Grimes, 36 So. 3d at 217; Dixon, 223
So. 3d at 664 n.8 (Gravois, J., dissenting).
217. See Stafford, 212 So. 3d at 1263; Grimes, 36 So. 3d at 217; Dixon, 223
So. 3d at 664 n.8 (Gravois, J., dissenting).
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The Louisiana appellate courts, however, have been silent on the
appropriate procedure when only some and not all of the co-defendants
successfully appeal a fellow co-defendant’s summary judgment dismissal,
particularly on how the trial court should conduct a comparative fault
allocation.218 In Dixon,219 LPG was the only co-defendant to appeal the
summary judgment dismissal of Jackson.220 Progressive Security
Insurance Company and Tudor Insurance Company elected not to appeal
Jackson’s summary judgment dismissal.221 Only co-defendants who
successfully appeal should receive a benefit from their successful
appeal.222 Co-defendants that do not appeal should not benefit from the
return of the formerly dismissed party because article 966(G) applies
between the co-defendant who did not appeal and the formerly dismissed
co-defendant.223 The co-defendants who did not appeal should be subject
to article 966(G) and should not be allowed to admit evidence attempting
to establish the fault of the formerly dismissed party, nor be able to
reference the formerly dismissed party’s fault at trial.224 The parties who
did not appeal, therefore, will not gain a direct benefit from the formerly
dismissed party returning to the suit.225
The co-defendants who did not appeal, however, could potentially
receive the incidental benefit of having their portion of the fault reduced
by the co-defendants who successfully appealed and were then successful
in establishing the fault of the formerly dismissed party.226 Instructing the
jury to only allocate fault to the formerly dismissed party from the fault of
the successfully appealing party would be impractical and difficult for
juries to implement.227 Therefore, the court should list the formerly
dismissed party on the jury verdict form.228 The formerly dismissed party,
however, should not be held liable for any damages to the plaintiff who
did not appeal, and only the successfully appealing co-defendants can
attempt to establish the previously dismissed co-defendant’s fault at
218. See Dixon, 223 So. 3d at 663 (Gravois, J., dissenting).
219. See supra Introduction, Section III.B.
220. Dixon, 223 So. 3d at 660.
221. Id.
222. See generally id. at 663 (Gravois, J., dissenting).
223. See Stafford v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 212 So. 3d 1257, 1263 (La. Ct. App.
1st Cir. 2017); Grimes v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 36 So. 3d 215, 217 (La. 2010).
224. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(G) (2018). See Stafford, 212 So. 3d at 1263;
Grimes, 36 So. 3d at 217.
225. See Dixon, 223 So. 3d at 664 n.8 (Gravois, J., dissenting).
226. See generally id. at 663 (Gravois, J., dissenting).
227. Id.
228. Id.
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trial.229 The co-defendants who did not appeal will be unable to establish
the formerly dismissed party’s fault because they are still subject to article
966(G).230 This process aligns with Louisiana’s comparative fault scheme
in that each party is only liable to the plaintiff for the harm they caused,
but it also gives a benefit to the co-defendants who successfully appealed
a co-defendant’s summary judgment dismissal.231 The successful codefendant, therefore, is allowed to prove the fault of the formerly
dismissed party and likely will get a reduction in liability.232
When the formerly dismissed party returns to the suit, the successfully
appealing parties should be given the opportunity to establish the fault of
that party and, if successful, have their fault reduced pursuant to
Louisiana’s comparative fault scheme. The plaintiff, because of article
966(G), should not be allowed to prove the fault of nor recover from the
formerly dismissed party if a successfully appealing party establishes the
previously dismissed party’s fault.233 In the event that only some of the codefendants appealed, the co-defendants who chose not to appeal should
not be given the opportunity to establish the fault of the formerly dismissed
party.234 Such defendants, therefore, should not receive a direct benefit
from the successful appeal.235
D. Hypothetical Example of How This Procedure Would Work in
Practice
Because of this procedure’s complexity when a formerly dismissed
co-defendant returns to the lawsuit, a hypothetical lawsuit demonstrating
this procedure is appropriate. Article 966(G) issues can arise in a variety
of different legal proceedings—including medical malpractice236 and slipand-fall cases237—but motor vehicle accidents make up the majority of the

229. Id.
230. See Dixon, 223 So. 3d at 660; Grimes v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 36 So.
3d 215, 217 (La. 2010).
231. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2323(A) (2018).
232. See generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 2323(A) (2018).
233. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(G) (2018).
234. See generally Dixon, 223 So. 3d at 663 (Gravois, J., dissenting).
235. See generally id.
236. Mercer v. Lowe, 217 So. 3d 1235, 1237 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2017);
Grimes v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 36 So. 3d 215, 217 (La. 2010).
237. Stafford v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 212 So. 3d 1257, 1263 (La. Ct. App. 1st
Cir. 2017) (noting that Stafford did not mention article 966(G) but is an example
of a type of case where an article 966(G) issue could arise).
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cases discussing a party’s appeal rights under article 966(G).238 Therefore,
a motor vehicle accident is an appropriate way to showcase the proper
procedure.
First, the plaintiff is injured in a multiple vehicle car accident. The
plaintiff does not know who caused his injuries and sues the drivers of the
three other vehicles that were involved, defendants A, B, and C. Each
party, including the plaintiff, is at fault for some of the plaintiff’s injuries.
Defendants A, B, and C each plead that the other defendants are liable for
the harm to the plaintiff. Defendant A files a motion for summary
judgment stating that no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding
his fault to the plaintiff and that he should be dismissed from the suit. The
trial court grants defendant A’s motion for summary judgment. Defendant
B elects to appeal defendant A’s summary judgment dismissal, but the
plaintiff and defendant C choose not to appeal. After a determination on
the merits because defendant B has the right to appeal defendant A’s
dismissal, the appellate court reverses, finding that the trial court erred in
dismissing defendant A on summary judgment.
At trial, defendant B is the only defendant in the suit allowed to
reference or provide evidence of defendant A’s fault because of defendant
C’s failure to timely appeal. Following trial, defendants A, B, C, and the
plaintiff will be on the jury verdict form. The jury will then allocate fault
to each of the four parties. Upon deliberation, the jury returns a verdict
that each of the four parties were liable for the harm alleged by the
plaintiff. The jury determines that: (1) the plaintiff is owed $100,000;
(2) defendant A was 20% at fault; (3) defendant B was 30% at fault;
(4) defendant C was 40% at fault; and (5) the plaintiff was 10% at fault for
the harm. The court will then prohibit the plaintiff from recovering the
20% of the verdict amount from defendant A because a final judgment
resulted between plaintiff and defendant A when the plaintiff did not
appeal the summary judgment dismissal of defendant A. The plaintiff will
receive $30,000 from defendant B and $40,000 from defendant C for a
total of $70,000. Through the appeal, therefore, defendant B reduced his
fault to the plaintiff by up to 20% by establishing the fault of defendant A.
If the jury determined that defendant C was less at fault because defendant
B established defendant A’s fault, defendant C will have received an
incidental benefit of a reduction in its fault.
This solution accomplishes several goals that enable the
implementation of the principles of article 966(G). First, a co-defendant’s
right to appeal will not depend on whether the plaintiff chooses to appeal.
238. Mire v. Guidry, 250 So. 3d 383 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2018); Dixon, 223
So. 3d at 660.
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Next, if the appellate court overturns the summary judgment dismissal of
a co-defendant, article 966(G) will remain in effect between the formerly
dismissed party and the parties who did not appeal. Finally, a successfully
appealing co-defendant will have the opportunity to prove the fault of the
formerly dismissed party and potentially lower its liability to the plaintiff,
while not giving a direct benefit to the co-defendants who did not appeal.
CONCLUSION
Louisiana appellate courts are divided on whether article 966(G) leads
to absurd results when a co-defendant is not allowed to appeal the summary
judgment dismissal of a fellow co-defendant because the plaintiff chooses
not to appeal the co-defendant’s dismissal.239 All parties, like LPG in Dixon,
have the right to appeal adverse judgments to them, and article 966(G)
results in co-defendants being adversely affected by a fellow co-defendant’s
summary judgment dismissal.240 The co-defendants, therefore, should be
able to appeal a motion for summary judgment dismissing one of several
co-defendants regardless of whether the plaintiff chooses to appeal and, if
successful, be given the opportunity to prove the fault of the formerly
dismissed co-defendant. In turn, this change will prevent situations that are
unfair to co-defendants.241

239. Mire, 250 So. 3d 383; Dixon, 223 So. 3d 658; Mercer, 217 So. 3d at 1235;
White v. La. Dept. Trans. & Dev., 258 So. 3d 11 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2017); LA
CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(G) (2018).
240. Dixon, 223 So. 3d at 660.
241. Id.
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